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This paper presents a model of a forward-looking government wooing foreign direct investment 
by enacting policies that reflect its commitment to the foreign enterprise. The ease with which the 
government is able to spend or carry out economic reform to complement the foreign venture 
evolves over time and influences the likelihood of its sustained commitment. The domestic and 
external strength of the government, the stability and not necessarily the level of returns from the 
project, venture-specificity of government spending or reform, and public and elite attitudes 
toward foreign commercial entry determine how invested the government remains in the long term 
success of the enterprise. More committed governments tend to be stronger and prefer robust 
investor-regime relationships. Reform that is not designed too narrowly to favor the investor is 
also less likely to be reversed later. Like pro-FDI public sentiment, a noisy policy environment 
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 Foreign direct investment has long been promoted as an effective vehicle for economic 
growth and development (World Bank, 2017). Understanding what determines the flow of 
foreign investment has been the focus of many scholars (Blonigen, 2005; Navaretti and 
Venables, 2006; Sekkat and Veganzones‐Varoudakis, 2007; Aziz and Mishra, 2016) and has 
informed government policies designed to attract FDI in a fiercely competitive environment 
amongst countries seeking multinational investment. It is well understood that large and growing 
domestic markets, macroeconomic stability, liberalization policies, energy availability, ease of 
doing business, and low corruption and political stability all encourage FDI. From the viewpoint 
of investors scoping the global economy for opportunities to put their capital to use, it is also 
important to understand the conditions under which governments are more likely to court foreign 
firms. Having a better sense of factors that make governments more hospitable to foreign 
investment has the potential to empower investors to win host country support for their ventures. 
 By concentrating on the competing opportunities and risks faced by governments and the 
varying strength of the regimes in office over time, this paper highlights the conditions that are 
more conducive to foreign investment. The main building block of our framework is the 
opportunity cost of government spending, in the form of actual funds or reform efforts, to 
prepare the ground for foreign commercial entry into its economy. These costs are influenced by 
the economic and political conditions under which policymakers operate domestically. For 
example, the opportunity cost of spending is higher if building infrastructure to support foreign 
entry into the economy diverts funds away from the construction of public hospitals. But this 
cost could be more manageable if the same infrastructure also provides uplift to a local 
constituency. Several studies provide the empirical basis for this foundation. For example, 
Hauptmeier, et al (2012) study 1100 German municipalities from 1998-2004 to conclude that 
infrastructure spending to attract business investment goes up (down) when neighboring 
municipalities raise (lower) their spending on infrastructure. Such competing spending can 
therefore be interpreted as having a lower opportunity cost owing to the precedent being set by 
the neighboring municipality.  
Hauptmeier et al (2012), along with Benassy-Querre et al (2005) and Redoano (2014), is 
representative of the large related literature on tax competition for foreign investment. These 
studies focus on the role of the cost of cross-border investment in determining investment levels, 
concluding that any such costs deter investment activity. Their results are applicable to any cost 
increasing measures such as taxes, but also to regulatory impediments that could be addressed 
via policy reform. Redoano (2014) treats EU membership as an indication of such costs being 
lower, which makes countries more sensitive to changes in the tax policy of other EU members. 
Benassy-Querra et al (2005) use 1994-2003 data on FDI flows from the US to 18 EU countries to 
confirm the importance of infrastructure and R&D by estimating that a one percent increase in 
road density increases FDI by 0.7 percent, and a one percent increase in R&D expenditures 
raises FDI by 1.1 percent. Together with their estimate that a one percent increase in taxes, a 
measure of the cost associated with investment, leads to a 3.5 percent decline in FDI, it suggests 
that countries with higher costs might still be able to attract significant FDI if they are able to 
offer robust infrastructure to support commercial activity. The results are consistent with the 
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conclusion reached by Hauptmeier et al (2012). Similarly, while regulatory reform that is not 
broad based but that specifically benefits the foreign enterprise would be more costly to the 
government, it could reduce the need to ensure targeted infrastructure provision to a foreign firm, 
mitigating some of that cost. While physical infrastructure is important, it should not detract 
from the crucial role played by other forms such as the availability of an appropriately trained 
and healthy workforce. For example, Asiedu (2006), Cleeve, et al (2015), Ghosh and Renna 
(2015), Kinda (2013), and Noorbakhsh et al (2001) provide evidence for human capital—
classified by some of these studies as sophisticated, created assets—being one of the most 
important determinants of FDI inflows. Significance of this aspect may be gauged from the 
recent finding by Hou, et al (2021) that high labor quality mitigates the negative effect of high 
wages on inward FDI. The finding runs parallel to the empirical result obtained by Sanz-Cordoba 
(2020) based on data from 30 countries over 1999 - 2014 that government investment in enabling 
infrastructure or productivity-enhancing policies substitutes for low capital taxation. Availability 
of such assets can also be seen as reducing the cost to the foreign enterprise in the same way as a 
streamlined FDI policy framework or rationalized institutions. Benefits to the regime from 
foreign investment depend in part on its international strength and credibility and can mitigate 
the impact of these costs. Simply put, a government would be more likely to be favorably 
disposed toward foreign entry given a propitious policy environment and if investment-friendly 
spending and reform do not have to be too narrowly targeted.  
 The following sections formalize these ideas and enrich them with further details. To 
capture the evolving decision-making environment under which policymakers operate, we 
employ the notion of forward dynamic utility (Musiela and Zariphopoulou, 2007), a 
generalization of the traditional utility function. It allows us to model the regime’s ability to 
withstand domestic economic and political pressure dynamically as it evolves over time 
following the dynamic programing principle. Given our interest in government decisions, we 
consider the case where the foreign investor sees the minimum threshold to proceed with the 
project being met and is prepared to invest a fixed amount in the country. A regime is then more 
likely to demonstrate a higher level of commitment to the foreign investor if the costs of 
overcoming opposition to the enterprise are low and the government has more bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the multinational.  
One of the issues faced by foreign investors is the uncertainty surrounding the credibility 
of commitments made by the host government (Aisbett et al., 2010). In sectors such as mining 
where sunk costs are high, this becomes a significant roadblock to attracting FDI. Understanding 
the likelihood of phenomenon like the obsolescing bargain—that is when governments seek to 
renegotiate contracts with terms more favorable to themselves and often at the expense of the 
investor after the initial investment has been sunk, risk has declined, and the project has become 
profitable—could help firms devise a more surefooted investment strategy. The dynamic nature 
of our framework pinpoints the factors a foreign investor would do well to keep track of over 
time to better anticipate the changing attitude of the host government toward the project. These 
factors determine the willingness of the government to implement and sustain spending and 
reform policies and include the nature and structure of the regime, the degree of accountability 
and susceptibility to public opinion, the extent of patronage, and the state of the overall 
economy. 
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The results reiterate and enrich the conclusions of the literature on economic policy 
reform which suggests that reforms that are reputed to be zero-sum or the wrong response to 
ameliorate living standards are likely to arouse opposition. Without taking the maxim that “good 
economics does often turn out to be good politics, but only eventually” (Rodrik, 1996, p. 10) for 
granted, this paper offers some answers to when ostensibly good politics can sustain economic 
reform. Like Haggard and Webb (1993) and Rodrik (2002), it suggests that, in the case of 
foreign investment policy reform, a lot rests on the government’s ability to create political 
support and overcome any opposition. The response and adjustment of government preferences 
to such exigencies in a dynamic setting allows our model to better account for their impact and 
bring forth their interactions with other relevant factors like expected returns and the scope of 
investments and reform. 
In the remainder of the paper, we develop and present our model with a forward dynamic 
utility of the government and stochastic returns in the next section. Results are then derived from 
a preliminary analysis and compared to a more comprehensive investigation using simulations in 
the following section. The results are used to shed light on foreign investment across the 
developing world with particular emphasis on FDI in mining. The focus is mainly on policy and 
contract reform although the results may also be seen in the context of joint ventures between a 
foreign enterprise and the government or a publicly owned firm. The final section concludes with 





Assume revenue depends on two activities. Let x be government investment in the 
activity in which it enjoys an advantage over the foreign firm—such as the provision of 
infrastructure or the development of a favorable regulatory and policy regime—and y be foreign 
investment in the project. We may think of y as input in production or mining. Revenue is given 
by the increasing function R(x, y). 
 The government’s return from the undertaking can be written in a way similar to 
Navaretti and Venables (2006) as follows: 
 
 𝜋𝐹 = 𝜃𝜑𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝑥𝑟 − 𝑐𝑥 = 𝜃𝑆 + 𝑥𝑟 − 𝑐𝑥,     0 <  𝜃, 𝜑 <  1. (1) 
   
The surplus φR(x, y) = S, which is the revenue in excess of what is earned when an outside 
option has to be invoked, is stochastic and depends on demand (or price). We model it as a 
Brownian motion (detailed in the next paragraph) because demand (or price) experiences 
continuous stochastic perturbation. A relatively strong outside option is therefore consistent with 
a low value of φ. The government’s share of the surplus is a fraction θ while the rest goes to the 
foreign firm. In this way, we are able to model the regime’s international standing and credibility 
as θ proxies its bargaining power. Other than complementing foreign production, government 
spending has alternate uses and this outside option is represented by r, while c is the per-unit cost 
of x. The return on alternate spending may be thought of as pecuniary—thus providing the 
government with an additional income stream to manage the risk associated with entering the 
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project—or public support garnered through that spending or resulting redistribution through 
economic reform. We rewrite (1) more simply as: 
 
 𝜋𝐹 = 𝜃𝑆 + (𝑟 − 𝑐)𝑥 =  𝜃𝑆 + 𝛿𝑥, (2) 
 
where δ = (r – c).  
Demand perturbations generally have many sources making the market outcome 
unpredictable. Generally, the random setting is described by letting (Ω, ℱ, {ℱ𝑡}𝑡≥0, 𝑃) be a 
filtered complete probability space and W = (W1, … , Wn) be an n-dimensional standard 
Brownian motion (Bass, 2011). The motivation for modeling perturbations in this manner is 
based on the everywhere-pervasive influence of the underlying factors present at any moment in 
time. Also, by the Central Limit Theorem, the statistical behavior of these factors, as well as that 
of the Brownian motion, is normal which again makes our modeling approach suitable. The 
specific context in this paper will make the setting more straightforward. 
 To incorporate the idea that the government’s preferences over risk might evolve over the 
course of the venture, we use the notion of forward utility. Risk preferences could change with 
the changing economic and political environment or simply because of a change in the political 
regime. The forward dynamic utility for the government is given by: 
 
 𝑈(𝑡, 𝜋) =  − exp(𝛾𝑡 − 𝑚(𝑡)𝜋), (3) 
 
where 𝛾𝑡 satisfies the stochastic differential equation 𝑑𝛾𝑡 = 𝐴(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝐵(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡)𝑑𝑊𝑡,   𝛾0 > 0, 
and m(t) > 0 is a deterministic function. The standard role of m in exponential utility functions is 
as a measure of the aversion to risk of the economic agent. We will argue in the next section that 
this risk aversion may be interpreted as the government’s domestic strength. The distinction 
made between the government’s internal and foreign strength in the model will allow for richer 
institutional analysis to be presented in the next section. 
  If the government does not enter into the project with the foreign firm, it still gets a 
constant return, ?̅?. In this case, the sector remains underexplored or underprovided as the status-
quo prevails.  
 The dynamics of xt are given by: 
 
 𝑑𝑥𝑡 =  𝛿𝑥𝑡𝑑𝑡,     𝑥0 = 1. (4) 
 
The surplus, St, satisfies the following stochastic differential equation: 
 
 𝑑𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇𝑆𝑡−𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎𝑆𝑡−𝑑𝑊𝑡,     S0 > 0. (5) 
   
Here, Wt is a one-dimensional Weiner process. We assume that δ in (4) and the mean surplus, µ, 
and volatility, σ, in (5) are all constant, which makes writing down the time subscript 
unnecessary. 
Without loss of generality, we assume positive initial government investment at time t = 
0 with its value at t > 0 given by: 




𝐹 =  𝑉𝑡
𝑆 +  𝑉𝑡
𝑂 , (6) 
 
where 𝑉𝑡
𝑆 = 𝜃𝑆𝑡 and 𝑉𝑡
𝑂 are the accumulated values at time t > 0 of the commitment to the 
project and the outside option respectively. Then, given any allocation of spending between 
investment in the joint project and the outside option, the dynamics of these accumulated gains 
for the government are described by: 
 
 𝑑𝜋𝑡
𝐹 =  𝛿𝜋𝑡
𝐹𝑑𝑡 + (𝜇 − 𝛿)𝜃𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝜃𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑊𝑡,     𝜋0
𝐹 > 0. (7) 
 
The government’s forward dynamic utility, U(t, π), in (3) is a continuous, random, (strictly) 
increasing concave function. For any initial π > 0, forward utility satisfies: 
 
 𝐸[𝑈(𝑡, 𝜋𝑡
𝐹)|ℱ𝑠] ≤ 𝑈(𝑠, 𝜋𝑠), (8) 
 
for any s, t, 0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡. Also, for any π > 0, there is optimal return π* such that: 
 
 𝐸[𝑈(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹∗)|ℱ𝑠] = 𝑈(𝑠, 𝜋𝑠
𝐹∗), (9) 
 
for any 0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡. We assume U(t, πt) to be a supermartingale for any π and a martingale for 
some π* which allows us to invoke the dynamic programing principle (Musiela and 
Zariphopoulou, 2007). 
 We specify a conventional (static) utility function u(π) as an initial condition such that 
𝑈(0, 𝜋𝐹) =  𝑢0(𝜋
𝐹), which evolves following the dynamic programing principle. In addition, we 
locally characterize U(t, πF) as: 
 
 𝑑𝑈(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹) =  𝛼(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹)𝑑𝑡 +  𝛽(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹)𝑑𝑊𝑡. 
 
(10) 
Then, by Ito’s formula (Kunita, 1997), utility dynamics can be written as: 
 
 𝑑𝑈(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹) = 𝛼(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹)𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹)𝑑𝑊𝑡
+ 𝑈𝜋(𝑡, 𝜋𝑡−
𝐹 )[𝛿𝜋𝑡






2 𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋(𝑡, 𝜋𝑡−
𝐹 )𝜎𝜃𝑡𝑆𝑡−𝑑𝑡 
                 = [𝛼(𝑡, 𝜋𝑡−
𝐹 ) + 𝛿𝑈𝜋(𝑡, 𝜋𝑡−
𝐹 )𝜋𝑡−










𝐹) + 𝑈𝜋(𝑡, 𝜋𝑡−
𝐹 )𝜎𝑆𝑡]𝑑𝑊𝑡. 
                                                      
(11) 
For notational convenience, we denote the terms in the first set of square brackets after the last 
equality in (11) above as follows: 
 
 𝑓(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹 , 𝑆) = 𝛼(𝑡, 𝜋𝑡−
𝐹 ) + 𝛿𝑈𝜋(𝑡, 𝜋𝑡−
𝐹 )𝜋𝑡−











Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming 14 (2022)
www.RofEA.org
The government’s utility in the case with foreign participation satisfies the following stochastic 
differential equation: 
 
 𝑑𝑈(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹) = − exp(𝛾𝑡 − 𝑚(𝑡)𝜋
𝐹) [(𝐴(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡) +
1
2
𝐵2(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡) − 𝑚
′(𝑡)𝜋𝐹) 𝑑𝑡
+ 𝐵(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡)𝑑𝑊𝑡], 
 
(13) 
and so, from (10), 
 
 𝛼(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹) = − exp(𝛾𝑡 − 𝑚(𝑡)𝜋
𝐹) [𝐴(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡) +
1
2






 𝛽(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹) = − exp(𝛾𝑡 − 𝑚(𝑡)𝜋
𝐹) 𝐵(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡). 
 
(15) 
Differentiating (14) with respect to πF yields: 
 
 𝛽𝜋(𝑡, 𝜋
𝐹) =  𝑚(𝑡) exp(𝛾𝑡 − 𝑚(𝑡)𝜋
𝐹)𝐵(𝑡 , 𝛾𝑡). (16) 
 
The first and second derivatives of the government’s utility are: 
 
 𝑈𝜋(𝑡, 𝜋






𝐹) =  −𝑚2(𝑡) exp(𝛾𝑡 − 𝑚(𝑡)𝜋
𝐹). (18) 
 
Using (16)-(18), we can rewrite (12) as follows: 
 
 
𝑓(𝑡, 𝜋𝐹 , 𝑆) =  − exp(𝛾𝑡 − 𝑚(𝑡)𝜋











To analyze f(t, πF, S) further, we first solve: 
 




 𝑚(𝑡) = 𝑚0 exp(−𝛿𝑡). 
 
(20) 
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The right-hand side in (20) implies that m(t) is always positive. Substituting (20) into (19) then 
yields: 
 




𝜎2𝑚2(𝑡)𝜃2𝑆2 + (𝜇 − 𝛿






Note that the term in the square brackets in (21) is concave with respect to S. As usual, we 












Further, if U(t, π) is a forward utility, then the following relationship must constrain A and B in 
order to put the requisite constraint on 𝛾𝑡: 
 
 𝐴(𝑡, 𝛾) = −
1
2
𝜎2𝑚2(𝑡)(𝑆∗)2 + (𝜇 − 𝛿 + 𝜎𝐵(𝑡, 𝛾))𝑚(𝑡)𝑆∗ −
1
2
𝐵2(𝑡, 𝛾). (23) 
 
Our analysis is now going to be based on the main result in (22) and its associated constraint in 
(23) above. The expression for 𝑆∗ in (22) gives the accumulated value from the project at any 
point in time and is critical to understanding the government’s optimal strategy dynamically. The 
condition in (23) adds richness to our analysis by ensuring the forward nature of preferences that 
may be interpreted as resulting from the evolving decision-making environment over time. 
 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
 
 Before using simulations to conduct the main analysis, it is useful to get an intuitive feel 
for the results by exploiting simple algebra. Equations (22) and (23) allow us to write: 
 
 






From (24) and the optimal surplus condition in (22), it is clear that the rents from the joint 
project depend on several factors. The government’s share of the surplus, θ, inversely affects the 
optimal surplus. As indicated before, it is useful to think of this parameter as a reflection of the 
relative bargaining power of the two parties. A higher θ is consistent with the government having 
a stronger bargaining position, enabling it to claim a larger share of the resulting surplus. As 
expected, our result suggests that the foreign firm’s weaker bargaining position leads to 
underinvestment in the project, provision of few investment incentives, and a lack of government 
commitment to reform. 
 The condition also confirms the intuition that a strong economic environment that 
supports robust demand for the product, reflected in a higher value of µ, would encourage the 
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parties to undertake the project. The condition further underscores that turbulence in the market, 
captured by a higher value of σ, reduces the proclivity to invest. Rents also have a negative 
relationship with δ = (r – c), which can be thought of as the net return on the outside option, 
likely because a higher net return would undermine the likelihood of the joint project moving 
forward. A higher cost to the government of investing in the project also reduces the chance of 
running into the hold-up problem in the future. One way to consider this cost is to think of it as 
the cost of remaining in power. For example, in the case of democratic regimes, the cost of 
investment could be the opportunity cost of public spending in other sectors of the economy. The 
cost may also be thought of as the political capital expended or the effort required to overcome 
organizational inertia, resource constraints, or other opposition to affect institutional and policy 
reform that is more favorable to foreign investment. A government would then be expected to 
escalate its commitment to the joint project if diverting funds to the project and away from 
alternate uses—such as social sector spending on health and education, or legislative work in 
other areas—requires overcoming considerable opposition and creates high political costs. 
Democratic governments with strong checks and balances are therefore more likely to skirt the 
hold-up problem and would have more at stake in the success of the project. Fledgling 
democracies and other regimes with weaker institutions and endemic corruption are likely to be 
unenthusiastic and less reliable partners for the foreign investor. In particular, authoritarian 
regimes are likely to enter into such projects only to the extent that these benefit the 
powerholders and their enablers with the possibility that the project is abandoned before takeoff. 
Kleptocratic institutions that are strong enough to ensure ongoing and adequate returns for the 
regime to fund a system of patronage would raise the possibility that an authoritarian government 
stays in the partnership. 
 The model also predicts that a regime with higher a tolerance for uncertainty is likely to 
invest more in the project for any given level of international investment as m is inversely related 
to the surplus. Weaker regimes, i.e., regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, that face 
meaningful domestic opposition, have underdeveloped or crisis-ridden economies, are saddled 
with a heavy debt burden, or are experiencing bouts of resource nationalism would be more 
averse to the risk of failure. The possibility of accountability in any form would then contribute 
to the policymaker being more risk averse in a manner analogous to that discussed in Bozeman 
and Kingsley (1998) for public organizations. Such resistance would be lower in times of crises 
when payoffs to different economic agents are altered and make policy reform more likely 
(Sturzenegger and Tomassi, 1998). Allowing m to vary over time also admits the outcomes of 
similar past endeavors as determinants of how willing policymakers are to entertain the 
possibility of failure. Impacts of previous attempts on, for example, the distribution of gains 
could reasonably affect current support for attracting foreign investment and driving reform 
forward. Domestically strong regimes would be characterized by an absence of sclerotic 
policymaking institutions, display firmer policy commitment, and be avid supporters of the 
project because they would be better able to negotiate failure of the enterprise or, in the case of 
being signatories to international trade and investment treaties, increase their immunity to 
domestic pressure to expropriate foreign assets outright (Büthe and Milner, 2008). 
 To do the analysis more comprehensively, we revisit (22) and (23) and the terms A(t, γ) 
and B(t, γ). This more completely (and correctly) reintroduces the relevant dynamic elements 
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into our analysis. Recall that 𝑑𝛾𝑡 = 𝐴(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝐵(𝑡, 𝛾𝑡)𝑑𝑊𝑡. We explicitly define these terms 
as 𝐴(𝑡, 𝛾) = 𝜔𝛾 and 𝐵(𝑡, 𝛾) = 𝜌𝛾, where ω and ρ are the mean and noise coefficients 
respectively. We begin by simulating the solution obtained in the previous section by varying the 
bargaining power parameter θ. This is presented in Figure 1. Owing to the form of (23) and (24), 
the curves in Figure 1 as well as the subsequent figures are bifurcated but this does not affect the 
trends identified in our results or our conclusions in any way. The domestic strength of the 
governing regime is captured by its tolerance for uncertainty and its ability to navigate project 
failure as indicated earlier and is measured on the horizontal axis. At any point in time and for a 
given level of foreign investment, the government’s commitment or investment to maintain 
optimal value in the project is tracked on the vertical axis. The model allows us to interpret the 
dependent variable on the vertical axis as either the government’s level of effort and commitment 
to economic reform—such as legislation or policies that incentivize investment—or actual funds 
invested by the government to complement FDI—for example, in the form of infrastructure 
provision. The figure supports the preliminary analysis and shows that weaker regimes 
(corresponding to a higher m) invest less in the project than stronger ones. Our framework allows 
us to distinguish between the strength of the regime at home and the strength it is able to project 
abroad in, for example, its negotiations with foreign entities. While domestic strength could be 
reflected in policy resoluteness and the lack of opposition the government faces at home to its 
legislative efforts, its ability to maneuver talks with a foreign partner is a separate and distinct 
capability. It is possible and even likely that regimes facing strong domestic opposition are also 
weak international negotiators or that governments firmly in control at home lack international 
credibility. Figure 1 captures these possibilities as well and shows that governments with strong 
bargaining power, regardless of their domestic strength, drive reform forward or invest more 
than those that lack negotiating capacity or international credibility with the commitment to 
reform or the level of investment falling along with the domestic strength of the regime. The 
figure also suggests that bargaining power matters little for domestically very weak regimes as 





The stability of returns from the project, which mainly depend on global market 
conditions, promotes higher government commitment with the domestically weaker regimes 
investing less than the stronger ones. Figure 2 further suggests that highly uncertain global 
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market conditions lead to a precipitous drop in government commitment. Large idiosyncratic 
volatility due to global political risks could explain this decline as in Boutchkova, et al. (2012). 
Any government, weak or strong, is likely to have only a marginal commitment to the joint 
project when future success cannot be predicted with confidence. Given a certain level of 
volatility in returns, Figures 3a and 3b vary the mean return to present differences in government 
commitment at different degrees of attractiveness of the outside option. The mean return 
represents the inherent value of the project where larger values could be returns specific to 
certain high-value industries. Both figures show that domestically weak regimes show weaker 
commitment to reform and invest less in the project irrespective of the mean return, indicating 
that even high-return projects may not find sufficient government support if the regime is 
domestically weak. Limited alternate use of the reform or investment outside of the joint project, 
i.e., a weak outside option, also discourages government reform efforts and investment, 
highlighting the forward-looking nature of the policymaker’s decisions. In that way, the return 
on the outside option fills the role of insurance against the risk of entering the project with the 
foreign partner. Better prospects of alternate use of the reform or investment would then improve 
the likelihood of a government undertaking efforts to support the project. In fact, as the outside 
option becomes stronger, disparities between reform and investment levels in projects with 
different mean returns become imperceptible as seen in Figure 3b, highlighting the 
complementary role to project-specific reform or investment played by alternate uses. The 
forward utility approach dynamically captures this link between partnering with the foreign firm 
and directing government efforts to reform or spending toward alternate uses, and highlights the 





The observation that government reform effort (or investment) approaches similar levels 
with sufficiently strong outside options points to the relative insignificance of the intrinsic value 
of the project to the government’s decision and suggests that government commitment would be 
higher as long as it has the flexibility to adapt the reform to other parts of the economy or 
allocate its investment to other uses if needed. This puts our simulation results in Figures 3a and 
3b at odds with our preliminary analysis in a crucial respect. Figure 3a shows that government 
commitment would not only be much lower with a weaker outside option but might even be 
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more sluggish if the mean return on the project is higher. This outcome appears less puzzling 
when we observe that the expected return on the project depends not just on the government’s 
commitment but also on foreign investment, which itself is in part determined by the prospects of 
the project (Blonigen, 2005; Navaretti and Venables, 2006). Foreign investment is likely to be 
higher with a healthier mean return on investment which could weaken the imperative to pursue 
policies that are highly accommodative of the foreign investor. The result is consistent with the 
empirical findings of Ahlquist and Prakash (2010) demonstrating a higher likelihood of 
accommodative institutional and policy reform by host countries when FDI is an exigent 
requirement for the host country. Government commitment would also be lower if the relative 
attractiveness of the project, φ, is low. The behavior can be seen as yet another reflection of the 
crucial role of the outside option and how it interacts with other variables in the decision process. 
With potent outside alternatives, the government is more open to the idea of committing to the 
foreign investor since it would be able to shift to the alternate use if needed and be able to avail 
the benefits created in the interim. But weaker options erode its fidelity to the project with an 
escalation of investment from the foreign partner further diminishing government commitment. 
How relationally specific and therefore less prone to adaptation to outside use the government’s 
reform or investment is, is more relevant to its project commitment than the intrinsic value of the 
project itself. This implies that kickbacks to government officials might not necessarily be a 
feature of high-value projects as commonly thought but a consequence of the jitters that 
policymakers feel at the prospect of committing funds and effort to an undertaking that has few 
other uses. As the simulations demonstrate, this is exacerbated if the regime is domestically 
weaker. It also means that foreign investors have a better chance of getting a government that is 
favorably disposed to their project if the government can be reassured of the flexibility of use of 
its investments. In fact, this could be a superior approach to securing government commitment 
than extravagant spending on the project by the foreign firm especially in relatively low-value 
industries.  
Figures 4a and 4b reinforce the previous point. The figures show how government 
commitment varies with the allure of the outside option. Weaker outside options leave the 
government less inclined toward the project. The simulations also bring to the fore how 
investment levels are affected by the government’s bargaining power vis-a-vis the foreign firm. 
Given the outside alternative, higher bargaining power enables a regime of any domestic strength 
to legislate and implement deeper reform or to invest more in the project suggesting that weak 
opposition and better domestic organization together with a strong international position induce 
vigorous government engagement, and a robust outside option further intensifies that 
participation. A strong bargaining position dampens the effect of the outside option as seen in 
Figure 4b where, notwithstanding the strength of the outside alternative, the differences in 
commitment levels are relatively small. This result becomes starker as regimes become 
domestically weaker—commitments in Figure 4b converge to the same level as domestic regime 
strength goes down. 
 




Government engagement is low if the regime’s own philosophy or public sentiment are 
hostile toward foreign investment. This is captured by a higher value of ω, the mean coefficient 
in the evolution of 𝑑𝛾𝑡. But the volatility of this intrinsic cost also affects government 
participation. Figure 5 highlights the link between commitment by regimes of varying domestic 
strength and the stability of their preference for foreign ventures. While domestically weaker 
regimes still affect less pro-investment reform than stronger ones, more unpredictable intrinsic 
costs—which may be interpreted as a measure of the regime’s uncertain political or policy 
environment—result in higher levels of government commitment to the project. A regime that 
faces a chaotic policy environment characterized by competing forces impinging on the policy 
process or vacillating, not necessarily positive, public perception of foreign investment commits 
more to the project. The result suggests that government cooperation with the foreign investor 
might be higher not just when the regime and the public are predisposed toward foreign 
investment but also when there is ambiguity regarding broader public support for such projects, 
such as when the government is unable to form an accurate picture of public or elite opinion. 
This result is analogous to the one obtained by Albertus and Gay (2019) that provides an 
explanation for higher investment under authoritarian regimes when the informational 
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 Considerable empirical support is available for many of the preceding analytical results. 
The foundational result in Figures 1 - 5 that weak regimes and institutions are tied with lower 
levels of commitment and investment has a long history in the literature (Knack and Keefer, 
1995; Mauro, 2002). More recently, Heimberger (2021) uses meta-analysis of 33 primary studies 
to conclude that partisan politics, an indication of domestic weakness of the regime, moderates 
the impact on corporate tax rates, a measure of regime commitment, of lower tax rates in 
competitor jurisdictions. This basic relationship also conforms with recent empirical findings that 
establish the link between institutional quality, particularly institutional distance and regulatory 
quality, and FDI (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 2013; Benassy-Quere, et al, 2007; Buchanan, et 
al, 2012; Olney, 2013). For instance, Benassy-Quere, et al (2007) find that a country with 
superior banks regulation, on average, receives 2.2 times higher inward FDI than a country 
where this aspect of control is lacking. A strong host-country institutional environment 
manifested, for example, in institutional governance, and fiscal and budgetary transparency is 
consistent with higher levels of inward FDI (Barry and DiGiuseppe, 2019; Cicatiello, et al, 2021; 
Fazio, et al, 2008; Kingsley and Graham, 2017) even in the absence of other reforms, confirming 
the insight captured by our simulation results in Figures 3 and 4 which suggest that the need for 
vigorous government commitment becomes less imperative if other offsetting variables are in 
place. For example, Suliman and Mollick (2009) find evidence of such an offsetting relationship 
between literacy and political rights on the one hand and war and domestic unrest on the other, 
while Kinda (2013) detects this link between human capital and infrastructure constraints, 
particularly in the case of horizontal FDI.  
 The link between government commitment in the form of investment promotion and FDI 
is explored by Loewendahl (2001) using case studies and empirically by Anyanwu (2006), 
Harding and Javorcik (2011), and Heilbron and Kronfol (2020). These studies affirm our result 
delineated in Figure 2 that government commitment in the form of investment promotion and 
regulatory reform is lacking in times of global market uncertainty. Their stressing of the 
importance of an intensive commitment to such policies in uncertain times further lends support 
to our results in Figures 3 - 4 of the substitutability of government commitment and an 
intrinsically favorable landscape for FDI. For example, Harding and Javorcik (2011) specifically 
find that investment promotion is more effective in countries with weak institutions that are less 
able to formulate efficient policies. That government commitment encourages FDI inflows is 
also confirmed by Dixon and Haslam (2016), who show that ratified treaties, a sign of 
government commitment, that offer investment protection encourage FDI while merely signed 
treaties do not. 
 Our results on the link between public sentiment and government commitment depicted 
in Figure 5 also find empirical validation when considered along with earlier conclusions arrived 
at in Figures 3 and 4. For example, Kunčič and Jaklič (2014), Li, et al (2019), and Yiu, et al 
(2021), all conclude that a negative view of foreign investment and asset acquisition deters FDI 
inflow. This means that maintaining an optimal level of investment from abroad would require 
compensating measures, such as the provision of enabling infrastructure or other forms of 
government commitment, to be taken by the host government. 
 The foregoing discussion of empirical evidence that is consistent with the conclusions of 
our model strengthens the case for its applicability. To further highlight the relevance of our 
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analytical framework, we consider case studies from the mining industry and provide exploratory 
evidence in the next section. 
 
 
4. Illustrations from the Mining Industry 
 
 To illustrate the main mechanisms proposed in the model, we provide some case study 
evidence from the mining industry. The discussion establishes the following claims which are 
consistent with the assertions of our framework: (i) domestically weaker governments show 
lower levels of commitment; (ii) internationally stronger regimes display higher levels of 
commitment; (iii) the promise of stable returns from a project promotes government engagement; 
(iv) project specificity of the reform effort or government investment deters regime commitment 
but being the stronger partner can help the government make up for a lack of enthusiasm; and (v) 
positive and even equivocal public opinion or elite sentiment toward foreign investment leads to 
stronger government commitment. 
 The risks associated with FDI tend to be high because of the various information 
asymmetries with which the investor has to contend. These risks are generally considered to be 
more acute if the host nation is a developing country where unstable governments, corruption, 
and poor socioeconomic conditions and bureaucracy are prevalent (Kasatuka and Minnitt, 2006; 
Tole and Koop, 2011). The mining industry is additionally characterized by large sunk costs, 
high capital intensity, volatile markets, and late payback. While the intrinsic value of the project 
is a crucial determinant of foreign investment, government commitment in the form of 
supportive policies also plays a significantly complementary role. Transparency, regulatory 
reform, and the manageability of investment risks including the risk of expropriation are all 
critical requisites for successfully attracting FDI. In trade focused sectors such as mining, trade 
policy reform is also a sign of the seriousness the government is affording to the task of 
attracting foreign investment. To improve the likelihood of these reforms, host countries have to 
invest in building a supportive political, legal, and institutional environment which, in turn, 
promotes FDI inflows (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). The groundwork that a government must 
do to attract investment in this sector is substantial with myriad infrastructure, security, and 
regulatory requirements needing to be fulfilled. In an intertemporal setting, even rents generated 
by the project in its early stages can be ploughed back into the economy to build roads, seaports, 
and airports, develop human capital through expenditure on education and health, and train and 
expand the civil service. Together with direct investment, regulatory reforms can be seen as 
inputs that are imperative to the production of output and ultimately to the success of the project. 
While liberalization of trade and the modernization of investment codes help at a general level, 
industry-specific legislative and policy reform is what is ultimately needed. These parochial 
steps, such as ensuring security of tenure, can be seen as a reflection of a government’s 
commitment to a project. 
 Governments whose ability to carry out their policy commitments is limited are 
considered to be domestically weak in this paper. That internally weaker regimes have lower 
levels of commitment to foreign investment can be seen in the examples of Indonesia and the 
Philippines, countries where a substantial devolution of power to local governments has resulted 
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming 14 (2022)
www.RofEA.org
in lower levels of investment in mining (O’Callaghan 2009, 2010). Nigeria presents another 
example of inconsistent federal and state level reforms and the will to implement them. This has 
hindered the effective use of rents generated by its resource boom resulting in often wayward 
spending and mismanagement (Ajakaiye, 2008). Often, this is due to the divergence between 
national policy and local sentiment toward foreign investment in the sector or a preference for 
domestic over foreign investment. Government effort and investment to achieve transparency 
and certainty in policies toward foreign investment are as important as commitments to build and 
upgrade complementary infrastructure. The discrepancy in national and local government 
attitudes or between different branches of government—like the legislative and the judicial—
also creates ambiguity and has adverse effects on investor confidence. For example, Pakistan has 
lately struggled to recover investor confidence after the recent case of a denial of a mining lease 
needed to continue operations in its Reko Diq area and the subsequent ruling in favor of the 
investor by a World Bank panel. But Pakistan’s willingness to submit to the international 
tribunal’s ruling is an example of steps countries can take to signal their commitment to foreign 
investors and to transparency. 
 The cases of Zambia’s copper industry and Argentina’s relationship with its oil are 
illuminating examples of the highs and lows of government commitment with a changing 





 Copper permeates the history and economy of Zambia. But the global market is large by 
comparison and keeps Zambia in the role of a price taker having to contend with high price 
volatility. Production costs in the country are also significant owing to its complex geology and 
reduce potential rents. Following peak production in 1969, Zambia began its process of state 
ownership and by 1982 held a majority stake in copper mining. But the period that followed was 
hardly a triumph with rampant corruption fueling enormously costly rent-seeking activities 
(Bates and Collier, 1995). With declining prices and output growth and rising expenditures, 
Zambia’s debt increased and ensuing adjustments led to falling investment which was barely 
high enough to maintain the capital-labor ratio in the sector. This was accompanied by falling 
consumption and deteriorating social indicators (Dinh, et al., 2002). With little room left for the 
government to maneuver and institute requisite changes to deal with the crisis, it embarked on an 
effort to shepherd foreign investment into mining through the privatization of the by now loss-
making national mining company. 
 Given the feeble financial condition of the company, the government was in a weak 
negotiating position and had to not only piece apart the conglomerate for sale but also hold on to 
pension and other contingent liabilities. The task force charged with overseeing the privatization 
process was staffed with ex-senior managers from the firm and, according to the World Bank, 
was in direct conflict with the goal of privatization. Bargaining power, too, resided 
asymmetrically with the investors and the dim industry outlook at the time meant that sales were 
achieved, after some initial breakdowns in negotiations, at uninspired prices. While the 
government retained some equity interest, this mostly hovered around 15 percent in most of the 
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components sold and was mainly to assist in the funding of the aforementioned liabilities. The 
resulting tax regime was highly favorable to the investors with below average royalty rates, an 
effective rate of 25 percent on taxable profits, fully deductible interest costs and repatriated 
profits, and capital input free from import duties (Adam and Simpasa, 2011). The extremely 
favorable outcome for investors occurred with a backdrop of historically low global copper 
prices and a nebulous public stance toward foreign engagement, underscoring the government’s 
elevated level of commitment to foreign investment as predicted by our framework. Prodigious 
proportions of rents were remitted to overseas headquarters of the foreign mining companies as a 
result. That all this happened when the government significantly lacked bargaining power reveals 
the tremendous pressure it was under to accomplish the goal of privatization during this period. 
 The public perception that the mining boom was almost entirely bypassing the domestic 
economy translated into a sharp shift away of support from the ruling regime and a jump in 
popularity of the opposition parties. The rising tide of anti-foreign investment sentiment in the 
country increased the political cost to the government of courting foreign partners and prompted 
it to revise the overly investor-friendly mining tax law. This was seen by the foreign mining 
investors as a reduction in the government’s commitment to the sector but, with an upsurge in 
global copper prices, the perception reverted to being favorable after only modest changes to the 
tax code as initially proposed. This underscored the government’s ability to sustain foreign 
participation even as its policies became less conducive to rent appropriation by the firms in 
times of higher mean returns on investment due to better copper prices in world markets. The 
subsequent rise in government expenditure on broad-based infrastructure and increase in non-
traditional exports serve as demonstration of the regime choosing to put more emphasis on its 




 Issues surrounding the prospecting for oil and resource ownership have been an abiding 
feature of Argentina’s modern economic history. Policy has swung between being highly 
accommodating of foreign investment and actively discouraging it. However, public sentiment 
toward the oil sector is generally nationalistic and averse to foreign participation in the sector 
(Gadano, 2010). Two episodes in this history are particularly illustrative. Consistent with public 
sentiment were President Peron’s pro-nationalization policies toward oil in his first term in 1946. 
But policy orientation turned toward attracting foreign participation by the second term to 
maintain elevated levels of domestic spending. In a deteriorating political environment rendering 
it increasingly weaker, the government entered into an agreement with a subsidiary of Standard 
Oil, a suboptimal strategy based on the foregoing analysis. The highly unpopular agreement was 
terminated soon after the regime was overthrown and the new government subsequently quickly 
nationalized much of the sector. 
 Transformative but controversial policies were in play in the 1990s with Argentina 
experiencing hyperinflation at the start of the period. Macroeconomic stabilization policies were 
pursued by a government with a preference for an orthodox approach, and augmented by 
privatization and deregulation of the economy, including that of the oil sector (Pastor Jr and 
Wise, 1999). Consistent with the emphasis of our model, agreements that were highly favorable 
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to private firms were reached by a weak regime with little bargaining power and a predilection 
for private investment. The contracts granted the firms exploitation concessions and limited the 
government to simply collecting income taxes. The policies went further to facilitate production 
and export by allowing firms to build and operate oil refineries and gas stations, making the 
transport of crude and byproducts easier, and guaranteeing the availability of foreign exchange. 
 The crisis of 2001 led to a major devaluation of the currency and default on public debt. 
The impact of the downturn on the oil sector was yet another reversal of the policies set in 
motion in the 1990s. Firms could no longer take foreign exchange availability for granted and 
significant export taxes on crude were imposed leading to the exit of many foreign investors. The 
general mood in the aftermath of the crisis also turned sour toward foreign corporations, 
including oil giants Shell and Exxon (Shever, 2012). This swing between accommodative and 
restrictive policies under changing circumstances, which included shifting political attitudes and 
public sentiment toward foreign participation as well as fluctuating economic fortunes of the 
country that fed into the regime’s domestic strength and international credibility, ably depict the 
mechanisms of our framework. The dance between pro- and anti-foreign investment positions 
has continued with the President (until 2019) Macri’s administration yet again wooing foreign 
investment in oil. 
  
There are many examples of different types of regimes in developing countries courting 
foreign investment. It is also true that the enthusiasm with which foreign investment is pursued 
varies significantly. In the mining sector, these differences appear to be correlated with the 
strength of the government both internally and externally, the stability of the economy, and 
alternate avenues to fruitfully expend government efforts, all of which is consistent with the 





 For multinational firms that have identified investment opportunities across the globe, it 
is critical to understand the factors that contribute to a host government inviting investment in to 
the sector being targeted by the firm. Once in, it is also imperative to appreciate the elements of a 
mutually beneficial ongoing relationship. This paper introduces a dynamic framework to 
examine a government’s decisions and the processes that give rise to them. Focusing on the 
cross-relevance of government spending or reform efforts as proxies for government 
commitment to foreign investment, we have proposed that the adaptability of spending or reform 
efforts to uses other than investor support is a major determinant of the durability of the project’s 
success. The adaptability of spending or reform efforts to other parts of the economy over time 
provides an insurance mechanism to the government against the failure of the project. To ensure 
access to a resource that the firm aims to reach, it could then be helpful for the investor to 
directly assist in politically high-value projects like infrastructure development and even capacity 
building for reform. The financing of schools, hospitals, and roads by oil majors in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria and Chinese investment in Africa, Latin America, and in countries along 
the Belt-and-Road Initiative can be seen in this light. It should quickly be added, however, that 
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the extreme turmoil and violence in the case of Nigeria alerts us to a multitude of other factors at 
play which are not accounted for by our framework. 
 Earlier discussion in this paper has already highlighted the potential influence of many 
factors such as institutions and human capital that encourage inward FDI and enhance the 
robustness of government commitment. More nuance can be added to this discussion by further 
disaggregating factors like institutions. For instance, there is reason to believe that the political 
structure of the host country and associated political environment would exert influence on 
government policy. Our model incorporates this insight by deploying the idea of a forward utility 
function of the government, which allows for evolving preferences due to factors like a changing 
political environment and institutional backdrop. This suits our purpose of focusing on the 
stability of policy choices, but correlating this stability with exact political structures could be a 
fruitful direction for future research.  
Empirical research could serve as a guide in this endeavor. In addition to the many 
studies cited earlier, Bailey (2018) and Sabir, et al (2019) are comprehensive recent analyses of 
how institutional quality affects FDI inflows in both developing and developed countries and 
identify political stability, democracy, rule of law, and institutional reform, among others, as 
important determinants, particularly in developed countries. Bougharriou, et al, (2021) confirm 
these findings for Arab countries. These various aspects of institutional quality appear to be 
complementary to corporate tax and regulatory policy in empirical research and lend further 
support to the implications of our model, particularly those captured in Figures 1 - 4. It is 
reasonable to expect that political and civil liberties would also exert influence on inward FDI. 
While Busse (2004) finds evidence of a negative relationship between repression and FDI 
inflows in the 1990s, the link appears to be positive in the 1970s and 1980s. The nonlinearity of 
the relationship that is hinted at is addressed by Harms and Ursprung (2002) and Filippaios, et al 
(2019) who find evidence contradicting the hypothesis that political and civil repression boost 
FDI by accounting for other relevant variables like country risk and oil exports, as well as human 
capital. In fact, the negative impact on inward FDI is amplified by media reporting of human 
rights abuse and public shaming by UN human rights bodies (Vadlamannati, et al, 2018). Anwar 
and Cooray (2102) provide further support by showing that political and civil liberties contribute 
positively to financial development, which in turn attracts more FDI in South Asia. A more 
direct link between political and civil liberties and FDI inflows is established by Dutta and Osei‐
Yeboah (2013). Incorporating the many manifestations of institutional strength and quality into 
an analytical framework could enrich our understanding of the interlinkages that are insisted 
upon by our model in its emphasis on the complementarity between the various determinants of 
FDI inflows. 
 Another important point is the robustness of policy reform brought about during a crisis. 
The popularity of such reforms often erodes quickly once the crisis is staunched and growth 
recovers. Our model accounts for this lack of policy legitimacy with repercussions that the 
government would have to deal with in later periods. With a changing public sentiment toward 
reforms once the crisis has abated, our model points toward an increasing likelihood of policy 
reversal. In that sense, our framework brings to the foreground the conditions under which 
reform is likely to be sustained. 
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The paper also suggests several directions for future research. For example, the analysis 
assumes no endogenous possibility of renegotiating the terms along which the gains are shared 
between the firm and the host government. The notion of dynamic utility employed here is an 
efficient way to acknowledge changing government preferences over time in a continuous time 
framework given that our goal was to identify enabling factors that foreign investors should look 
for at any point in time. But it is conceivable that bargaining power would evolve over time or 
that circumstances, such as the world price, would change, necessitating a redesign of the 
agreement between the two parties. It is likely that investment agreements would impact the 
distribution of the resulting gains and consequently in income and wealth distribution. 
Incorporating the implications of these changes on government bargaining power is hence a 
crucial element in the story. Modeling renegotiation as a strategic interaction and incorporating 
sectoral peculiarities and country specifics in that process could shed light on determinants 
unique to certain industries. Also, depending on the sector in which investment is made, prices 
and revenues are susceptible to abrupt step changes. These sudden changes could have far-
reaching implications for the political arrangements that underpin policymaking and could 
remain in the system due to long-term memory. Including these features in the model, while a 
considerable challenge, would be an insightful extension. While modeling strategic interaction in 
continuous time has the drawback of producing elusive or intractable solutions, the methods 
introduced by Sannikov (2007, 2008) to address difficulties such as finding equilibrium solutions 
could prove to be effective in this regard. 
The structure of the model benefits from assumptions that simplify our analysis. This has 
both advantages and drawbacks. The framework exploits stochasticity to incorporate a change in 
variables that directly impinge upon the government’s decision-making process. While this 
forgoes the strategic interaction between the policymakers and domestic players at one level and 
between the government and the investor at another, it has the advantage of putting the spotlight 
on factors directly relevant to a government’s commitment to FDI. Future research could 
additionally delve deeper into the mechanisms that bring about those changes. We also treat 
opportunities to direct legislative effort toward narrowly benefiting the regime and its supporters 
or to syphon off funds at par with bona fide uses like development-focused spending or reform 
based on the assumption that both make the regime better off. We speculate that incorporating a 
change to distinguish between these development-focused and predatory uses is unlikely to alter 
our results regarding government commitment and would likely only strengthen them. But it is 
reasonable to expect that the exact nature of the opportunity costs involved would still have 
implications for the broader development picture and as such presents another promising avenue 
for subsequent research.  
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